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Summary 
Konkurrensrätt och immaterialrätt är två rättsområden som båda är viktiga 
för att främja den ekonomiska utvecklingen i samhället. Vid en första 
anblick verkar det som om dessa två områden strävar i motsatt riktiga; 
konkurrensrätten syftar till att reglera marknaden och främja en effektiv 
konkurrens, medan immaterialrätten bygger på att skapa en ensamrätt och 
ett skydd mot konkurrenter.  
 
Både inom EU och i USA har vikten av att tillhandahålla lämpligt 
skyddslagstiftning för immateriella rättigheter. Utan en sådan 
skyddslagstiftning skulle incitament att utveckla och investera i nya projekt 
minska. Uppfinnare och investerare skulle fråntas möjligheten att ta igen 
sina investeringar och göra en eventuell vinst. Det är dock viktigt att komma 
ihåg att det exklusiva skydd som immaterialrätt skapar inte sträcker sig hur 
långt som helst. Visst beteende kan ha konkurrenshämmande effekt, vilket 
konkurrensrätten kommer att reagera på. Dock så kräver parallell 
tillämpning av dessa två rättsområden noggrannhet och försiktighet. En 
balans måste urskiljas mellan för att de skall få upprätthålla sina olika 
karaktärer.  
 
Ett försöka att uppnå denna balans har konsumtionsprincipen skapats. 
Ensamrätten till en skyddad produkt förbrukas i och med att produkten förts 
ut på marknaden, med innehavarens tillstånd. Köparen får då rätt att fritt 
använda produkten. Rätten att fritt nyttja inkluderar även rätten att reparera 
produkten när det krävs, dock så innefattar denna rätt inte rätten att 
rekonstruera eller tillverka en ny produkt. 
 
Följer man resonemanget ovan så verkar principen om reparation och 
rekonstruera tydlig och lätt uppfattad, dock så är inte gränsdragningen alltid 
så lätt. Olika domstolar har ändvänt sig av olika resonemang. Beroende på 
hur domstolen väljer att dra skiljelinjen kommer det ha en direkt påverkan 
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för rättsinnehavaren och tredjemans affärsstrategi. 
 
Genom att tillåta en bredd tolkning av vad som ingår i tillåten reparation 
kommer detta att främja konsumenternas välfärd och valmöjligheter. På 
andra sidan, om domstolen väljer en snävare tolkning kommer det ge 
rättsinnehavaren en möjlighet att kontrollera eftermarknaden, vilket kan ha 
effekt på konkurrensen. Hur som, var linjen skall dras, mellan vad som är 
tillåtet och otillåtet, så har varken någon domstol i USA eller EU funnit en 
princip som kan tillämpas på samtliga fall. Ett resultat av detta har företag 
tagit lagen i egna händer och skapat alternativa lösningar. Genom att införa 
begräsningar i användandet, genom avtal, försöker företagen att kontrollera 
konsumenterna och eftermarknaden. 
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Summary 
Competition law and intellectual property law are two equally important 
areas of law for creating a dynamic market and developing the economy. At 
first sight, these two areas of law seem to be in conflict; competition law 
seeks to regulate the market and promote efficient market competition, 
while the rationale for intellectual property right (“IPR”) is to grant their 
proprietor the exclusive right to dealing in them and protection against 
competitors. 
 
Both the EU and the U.S. recognize the importance of providing an 
adequate system for protecting IPRs. In the absence of protection, inventors 
cannot profiting from their work. This would risk depriving them of the 
incentive to invest in research and development. That said, certain behaviour 
with respect to intellectual property may have anti-competitive effects, 
which competition laws can and do protect against. Applying competition 
law and intellectual property law in parallel requires a careful balance if 
they are to maintain their different functions. The doctrine of exhaustion is 
such an attempt, trying to limit the exclusive right granted to a proprietor. 
Under the doctrine, the first sale of a protected article gives the purchaser a 
right to use it, but it does not include the right to replicate the patented 
invention. This can also be expressed by saying that the purchaser has a 
right to repair his article, but does not have the right to reconstruct it. Even 
though the doctrine of repair and reconstruction seems straightforward, it is 
not always clear where the line should be drawn. Various courts have used 
different methods in reaching their conclusion, which might both have an 
impact on competition and affect the business strategy of right holders and 
third parties. 
 
Allowing a broad interpretation of the repair doctrine will tend to increase 
consumer welfare while a narrower interpretation will allow the patentee to 
control the market, and to a large extent’ the competition. However, neither 
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the U.S. nor the EU have any legislation on the point nor are there 
absolutely clear-cut case law decisions. As a result corporations have 
created alternative contract law-based solutions by imposing post sale 
restrictions. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
“Before [the patent regime], any man might instantly 
use what another had invented; so that the inventor had 
no special advantage from his own invention. The 
patent system changed this; secured to the inventor, for 
a limited time, the exclusive use of his invention; and 
thereby added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, 
in the discovery and production of new and useful 
things.”1 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
In this quote, Abraham Lincoln described the purpose of the United States’ 
(“U.S.”) patent legislation. The same considerations underlie the policy 
behind patent legislation in the European Union’s (“EU”) Member States 
and the European Patent Convention (“EPC”). Intellectual property law 
regulates the creation, use and exploitation of creative or mental labour. An 
inventor acquiring an intellectual property right (“IPR”) is thereby rewarded 
with the grant of a right to exclude third parties. 
 
Nevertheless, upon the initial sale of the invention, the right to exclude 
becomes exhausted. The authorized sale of the protected product gives the 
purchaser a right to use the product for whatever purpose he or she chooses. 
What happens though, when the product breaks or becomes damaged? It 
might require repair or parts may need to be replaced. Are you, as the 
purchaser, allowed to perform the necessary maintenance or may part of that 
action exceed your right to use?  
 
                                                
1 Abraham Lincoln, second lecture on discoveries and inventions, delivered to the Phi  
Alpha Society of Illinois College at Jacksonville, Illinois, February 11, 1859 in Vol. III The 
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler ed. (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers 
University Press, 1953) p 363. Available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/  
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The right to use that a purchaser acquires certainly does not include the right 
to reconstruct or “make” a new product. Refurbishment that constructs a 
new version of the article can trigger the exclusive right a second time. The 
distinction, howevere, between permitted and prohibited actions is not 
always clear-cut. Competing interests must be balanced; on one hand those 
of the proprietor and on the other those of the purchaser.  
 
In the EU and various national jurisdictions, the impact of patent protections 
on competition law, relating to repair has not been explicitly provided for 
though this fundamental problem has been considered in certain trademark 
cases. The reasoning in these cases will be of interest as similar reasoning 
might one day be applied to patent law cases.  
 
One of these cases is the Swedish case Soda-Club2. The case concerned the 
question whether refilling gas cylinders, which were part of a trademarked 
home carbonation system, was an unlawful act of trademark infringement. 
The defendant, Vikingsoda AB (“Vikingsoda”), is a company whose main 
business consists of refilling used CO2 gas cylinders, such as the ones the 
plaintiffs’ Soda-Club Ltd (Israel), Soda Club International BV (The 
Netherlands) and Empire Sweden AB (jointly referred to as “Soda-Club”) 
home carbonation systems. After discovering Vikingsoda’s practice, Soda-
Club sued it for trademark infringement.  
 
Interesting, however, was an unexpected turn of events, when Vikingsoda 
complained to the Swedish Competition Authority, accusing Soda-Club of 
abusing its dominant position (by not permitting anyone else to refill their 
gas bottles.).3 The investigation raised many questions: should it be possible 
to contract out the doctrine of exhaustion? Should a rights owner be allowed 
to extend its IPRs in such a way that it excludes third parties from the 
                                                
2 Soda-Club (CO2) SA, Schweiz, Soda-Club International B.V, Nederländerna v Vikingsoda 
AB, Stockholm Tingsrätt 2010-02-05, Case no. T 17919-09, Injunction decision 
(“Injunction decision”.) 
3 Konkurrensverket dnr 632/2009, Decision 2012-03-02 (“Konkurrensverket dnr 
632/2009”.) 
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market? Can the scope of an exclusive right be utilised [in this way] by a 
dominant undertaking to infringe competition law?  
 
The answers to these questions will depend on various factors such the 
definition of the scope of the IPR and how the doctrine of exhaustion is 
determined. The definition of whether an action is a permitted repair or an 
illegal reconstruction will determine whether companies can use the scope 
of their IPRs to exclude competitors from the market. Expanding the IP 
protection to such extend that a user will be accused of infringement when 
he or she repairs his or her property can have an effect on competitive 
markets and consumer welfare. 
1.2 Purpose  
The purpose of this thesis is to define, from a competition law perspective, 
under what circumstances a third party may lawfully repair a patent 
protected product and when service or repair constitute unlawful 
reconstruction which infringes an intellectual property law. Moreover, will 
it be define what actions a patentee may take to extend its IP protection and 
limit actions on the secondary market, whiteout abusing its dominant 
position 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The traditional legal dogmatic methodology will be used to analyse the 
currently applicable legislation and the relevant EU cases. The subject under 
investigation has been inadequately discussed so far; this method thus aims 
to provide an understanding of the present legal landscape in the EU and to 
clarify how to approach the distinction between repair and reconstruction. 
Most of the European cases on this subject have been viewed as primarily 
an IPR issue, and due to the territorial nature of IPR, they have rarely 
considered the international and, especially the EU perspective. It is 
therefore necessary to consider national as well as EU law if we wish to 
have a complete understanding of the legal landscape in the EU.  
 10 
 
The legal dogmatic method will be complemented by a comparative study 
of the legal situation in the U.S.. This method will provide the reader with a 
more nuanced understanding of the problem and suggest possible future 
developments in the EU. However, in using this method, the main focus is 
to describing an alternative perspective and reasoning taken toward the same 
questions and to suggest how the EU should approach the problem in the 
future.  
 
Additionally, the thesis will also employ a law and economics perspective 
when investigating the consequences that the legal developments might 
have on the incentives to innovate and market of new products.  
 
1.4 Material 
In this thesis, the relevant case law of both the European Court of Justice 
(“CJEU”) and of several Member States will be of central importance. A 
range of academic books, articles and academic writings will also be 
consulted in order to illustrate the debate regarding repair and 
reconstruction. Furthermore, official documents from EU sources 
concerning the application and interpretation of relevant legislation will also 
be of relevance. The sources used for the comparative analysis will include 
relevant U.S. case law and legislation. Academic books, articles and 
academic writing will also be of importance here.  
 
Material for this thesis is found in printed books and learned journals as well 
as on the Internet. Due to the lack of interest in this subject within the EU, 
some comments and “blogs” found on the Internet will be reviewed with a 
critical eye and used for the purpose of inspiration only. In regard to cases 
from Germany, secondary sources will be used because of lack of relevant 
language skills.  
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1.5 Delimitations 
This thesis will investigate the interaction between competition law and IP 
law. IPR is a generic term for various property rights, such as patents, 
trademarks, copyright, trade names and indications of origin. This thesis 
does not aim to cover the whole IP field. When the term “IPR” is used, it 
will refer primarily to patent law. In chapter four, case law regarding 
trademark rights will also be reviewed. When this kind of right is discussed 
it will be expressly identified as such. 
 
The first part of this thesis is devoted to a general presentation of 
competition law, IPR, the exhaustion doctrine and the concept of implied 
license, from which the reader will obtain some basic knowledge of these 
topics. A deeper discussion on the functioning of Article 101 and 102 (the 
competition law articles) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”) falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Owing to the limited amount of case law in the EU, these cases will be 
extensively discussed, as will some Member State cases. The examination 
of national case law has been limited to cases from Sweden, Germany and 
the United Kingdom (“UK”). Only decisions from the Supreme Court level 
will be considered. The reason why these countries have been chosen is 
because of their well-developed systems of IP protection, which have 
emerged as a result of their interaction with a global economic society. Due 
to limited space, there is no room for any comprehensive discussion of the 
European Patent Office (“EPO”) and the EPC. For the same reason there 
will not be any examination of the relevant national legislation regarding 
IPR. 
 
In order to present a comprehensive comparative picture, the extensive 
number of U.S. cases had to be scrutinised and limited. Therefore, only 
cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal 
Circuit”) and the U.S. Supreme Court will be addressed. 
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1.6 Outline 
Chapter two and three will provide a general introduction to competition 
law and IPR and to the interface between these two areas of law. The 
situations in the EU and the U.S. will be investigated and a conclusion will 
be presented with respect to their different approaches. This part will also 
include a general overview of the principles comprising the exhaustion 
doctrine and the concept of an implied license.  
 
Chapter four will explore the EU perspective on the problem of repair and 
reconstruction. An analysis of the case law and doctrine of the national 
jurisdictions selected will follow. In the concluding section, similarities and 
differences will be analysed in order to clarify the status quo in the EU. 
 
Chapter five will discuss the U.S. perspective on repair and reconstruction. I 
aim to compile and synthesize the opinions of the different courts to obtain a 
sense of current developments. An analysis of the material will be 
concluded in the end of the chapter.  
 
Finally, I will conclude this thesis with some words on the issues discussed 
while highlighting the conclusions of each part. The respective strengths and 
weaknesses in the two legal orders will also be discussed here. I will try to 
review both the similarities and differences between the systems and their 
use of law and argument in order to apply a new perspective to the EU 
approach. 
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2 Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property 
Competition law and IPRs are two areas of law which are both central to 
economic development. It is, however, noteworthy that enforcement of IPRs 
may be anti-competitive since the very nature of IPR provides the holder 
with an exclusive market position. 
 
Over the years, competition law has developed into one of the levers used in 
the EU to achieve the objective of a free internal market. The situation 
regarding IPRs is somewhat different. To a large extent the scope of IP 
protection is one for the Member States to decide. This chapter aims to 
provide an overview of the primary functioning of competition law and 
IPRs in the EU. 
 
2.1 Competition Law: A General 
Introduction 
The economic policy of the EU is based on the principle of an open market.4 
According to Protocol 27 of the Lisbon Treaty, the internal market includes 
a system ensuring that “competition is not distorted”5, therefore, it lies 
within the Unions exclusive competence to establish “the competition rules 
necessary for the function of the internal market”.6  
 
The competition rules consist of a combination of EU legislation, national 
rules, and agreements with international organisations and third countries.7 
                                                
4 Article 119 TFEU deals with Economic and Monetary policy and explains Article 3 
Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) which contains the Union’s objectives. Article 119 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2008 C 115/47 (“TFEU”.) 
5 TFEU Protocol (No 27) On the Internal Market and Competition 
6 Article 3 (1)(b) TFEU “The Union Shall have the exclusive competence in the following 
areas:…(b) the establishment of the competition rules necessary for the function of the 
internal market…. 
7 Hans Henrik Lidgard, Part I, Competition Classics” Material & cases on European Law 
and Practice, (Lund, Maria Magle Publishing, 2011) (“Competition Classics”) p. 33. 
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The two main Treaty articles used for pursuing the free competition aims of 
the Union are Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.8 Article 101 TFEU prohibits 
agreements between undertakings which restrict competition and Article 
102 TFEU prohibits abuses of a dominant position.9 Both of them have 
direct effect in the Member States and on their citizens and the rules have 
been given meaning through a lengthy process of interpretation by the EU 
institutions10.11  
 
The EU competition policy serves one goal; to make sure that the market 
can operate as efficiently as possible to deliver the best outcomes for EU 
citizens.12 Still, the modus operandi reflected in the Commission’s 
enforcement efforts are not established in the Treaties13 and has therefore 
been subject to much debate. A number of principles, such as enhancing 
efficiency, consumer welfare, the protection of small and medium sized 
companies and creating a single European market have been emphasised as 
goals of central importance.14 Whatever principles are used to enforce the 
rules, EU competition law is autonomous and must be applied uniformly 
even if the application of other rights in the Member States may vary.15 
Today, however, consumer welfare is well established as the touchstone for 
the Commission’s enforcement efforts. Its aim is to protect the market as a 
way of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources, in both static and 
dynamic terms.16  
                                                
8  Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law The Objectives 
and Principles of Article 102 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) ("Foundations of 
European Competition Law") p. 2. 
9 Id.  
10 Namely the European Commission, and the Court of First Instance (now the General 
Court “CFI”), the European Court of Justice, (now the Court of Justice of the European 
Union) (“CJEU”.) 
11 Foundations of European Competition Law Fn 8 supra p. 11. 
12 Neelie Kroes, European Competition Policy- Delivering Better Markets and Better 
Choices, SPEECH/05/512, 15 September 2005, (“Kores”) p. 2 
13 Foundations of European Competition Law Fn 8 supra, p 3.  
14 Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 5d ed. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011) (“Craig & de Burca 5d”), pp 959-960.  
15 Jonathan D.C Turner, Intellectual Property Law and EU Competition Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2010) ("Turner") p. 4. 
16 Roger J. Van den Bergh & Peter D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics: A Comparative Perspective, 2d Ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) (“Van 
den Bergh & Camesasca”), p. 5.  
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2.2 Intellectual Property Rights: A General 
Introduction 
Intellectual property is a generic term for different rights such as patents, 
trademarks, copyright, trade names and indications of origin, each of which, 
however, providing its creator with a right to a legal monopoly for a limited 
period.17 Such protection is based on moral and ethical arguments giving 
creators natural and human rights over their labour.18 From an economic 
point of view, the purpose of these rights is to protect creativity and to 
promote innovation.19 The creator is given the possibility of recovering 
research and development costs invested and generally benefitting from his 
or her work.20 Without an adequate system of rights providing such 
protection, there is a risk that free riders will undercut competition, drive the 
price of products down to marginal levels and deter investors from investing 
money in new products. 21  
 
The EU Treaties neither define nor mention the term “intellectual 
property”.22 Despite that, Article 345 TFEU23 refers to “property ownership” 
and Article 36 TFEU24 uses the term “industrial and commercial property”. 
The competence for EU institutes to act in this field is very limited, since 
such competence largely belongs to the Member States.25 That said, some 
harmonisation has taken place with the view to limit the risk that national IP 
                                                
17 Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 3d ed. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003) (“Craig & de Burca 3d”), p. 1088. 
18 Article 27 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stating everyone’s right to the 
protection of his scientific, literary or artistic production.  
19 Marianne Levin, Lärobok i Immaterialrätt: Upphovsrätt, patenträtt, mönsterrätt, 
känneteckensrätt i Sverige, EU och internatonellt, 10th Ed. (Stockholm, Nordstets Juredik, 
2011) “(Levin”) p. 51. 
20 Thorsten Käseberg, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU 
and The US, (Oxford, Hart Publishing Ltd., 2012) (“Käseberg”) p. 11. 
21 Id. 
22 Turner, Fn 15 supra p. 8. 
23 Article 345 TFEU states that the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member 
States governing the system of property ownership. 
24 Article 36 TFEU lists the defences that could be used by Member Stats to justify national 
measures that imped free movement of goods.  
25 Article 345 TFEU.   
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protections may generate obstacles to the creation or maintenance of the 
internal market.26 In this case the EU rules is given primacy.27   
 
In regard to patent rights, there is today no unified protection in the EU even 
if patent law is a very technical area of law and in a free economy, patent 
protection constitute an important matter.28 Indeed, there are two systems; 
the national patent system and the European patent protection granted by the 
EPO in accordance with the rules in the EPC (which all Member States are 
signatories to).29 The EPC is however limited in scope and only provides a 
set of rules standardising national patent applications.30 It does not create a 
single European patent system but only a single system controlling how 
patents are granted. Once a patent is granted under the EPC, it becomes a 
bundle of national patents, subject to the national rules of the states selected 
in the application.31 Question regarding infringement and the public interest 
are left to be decided by national legislation.32  
 
Since the 1960s, there has been a wish to harmonise patent law and establish 
a Community patent. Attempts have been made to this effect but they all 
failed. As a result, the Commission issued a Green Paper on Community 
patents and the European patent system. After extensive consultation, the 
Commission adopted a Communication in 1999 as a follow-up to the Green 
                                                
26 E.g: Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 to approximate the law of the Member 
States relating to trade mark, Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and Council 
of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs, Directive 98/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions and Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
May 201 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society.  
27 Case 144/81 Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 14 September 1982  ([1982]) ECR 
2853, paras 18-20  
28 Hanns Ulrich, Parent Protection in Europe: Integrating Europe into Community or  
Community into Europe?, Eur. L. J. (2002) p. 434 (“Ulrich”).   
29 Id at pp. 435-436. 
30 Id at. p. 436. 
31 Vincenzo Di Cataldo, From The European Patent to a Community Patent, 8 Colum. J. 
Eur. L 19 (2002) p. 20 (”Di Cataldo”.) 
32 Ulrich, Fn 28 supra, p. 457. 
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Paper. The aim was to announce various measures that the Commission was 
planning to take in order to make the patent system more attractive.33  
 
The Lisbon Treaty opened up for further possibilities. Article 118 TFEU 
gives the Union power to “[T]o establish measures for the creation of 
European intellectual property to provide uniform intellectual property right 
protection throughout the Union[…].”34 This thus makes it possible for the 
EU to establish a EU patent system. On 4 December 2009, the Council 
adopted conclusions on a "Enhanced patent system in Europe".35 On the 11 
of December 2012 the European Parliament voted in favour the Council’s 
proposal of the two drafted EU regulations. The regulations concerns 
unitary patent protection and the translation agreements of such protections. 
The regulations entered into force the 20 January 2013, however, it will be 
applied from 1 January 2014. 
                                                
33 Commission of the European Communities COM (2000) 412 final of Agust 1, 2000, 
OJEC 2000 C E 337, 278, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community patent, p. 
5 (”Commission”.) 
34 Article 118 TFEU 
35 Council of the European Union, 1766871710 REV 1, Press release 2057th Council 
meeting, Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, Research and Space), (10 December 
2010) p. 9 ("Council meeting".)   
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3 The Relationship Between 
Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property Right 
This chapter aims to give a more comprehensive view of the interaction 
between competition law and IP law. Applying competition law and IP law 
in parallel requires a careful balance if their different functions are to be 
maintain. The CJEU has tried to strike this balance with its doctrine of 
“existence and exercise”36; while in the U.S., the courts have chosen a 
different approach.  
 
Competition law seeks to regulate the market and its participants, promote 
efficient market competition and a high level of economic performance. On 
the other hand, the essential feature of IPRs is the creation of protection 
against competitors by granting the rights holder an exclusive right.37 IPR 
provide legal barriers against third parties entering the market, while the 
competition law serves to keep the market open.38 At first sight, these two 
areas of law seem to be in conflict. One aims at what the other tries to 
prevent.39 But taking a closer look, one realizes that they both seeks to create 
markets beneficial to the development of new and better technology, 
products and services going to consumers to a lower price.40 Together they 
are essential to enable an undistorted competition.41 
 
3.1 The EU 
As mentioned above, competence with regard to IPR is to a large extent still 
the province of the Member States. Question such as validity, existence and 
                                                
36 Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v Commission, Judgment of 13 July 1966 [1966] ECR 299, p. 345. 
37 Levin, Fn 19 supra, p. 51. 
38 Käseberg, Fn 20 supra, p. 8. 
39 Turner, Fn 15 supra, p. 3. 
40 Richard Whish & David Bailey Competition Law, 7th Ed. (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012) (“Whish & Bailey”), pp. 769-770 
41 Turner, Fn 15 supra, p. 3. 
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infringement are then limited to the territories where the relevant IPRs have 
been granted.42 However, this division between the Member States and the 
EU should not be understood as an absolute prohibition on the Union 
institutions applying Community law to IPRs. If this were the case, it could 
lead to the destruction of the internal market with its concomitant free 
movement of goods. To avoid this problem, the CJEU created the doctrine 
of existence and exercise.43  However, the doctrine in it self is vague, and 
provides no specific guidance. Therefor, to determine under what 
circumstances the exercise of an IPR is permitted under EU law, the CJEU 
developed the doctrine of “specific subject-matter”.44  
 
Furthermore, the first cases45 regarding existence and exercise were 
grounded on Article 36 EEC which governed the free movement of goods.46 
Only later was the doctrines incorporated into competition law. The court 
held, in the case of Parker, Davis & Co.47, that competition law was similar 
to the considerations governing the free movement of goods and could also 
be used to limit the exercise of an IPR.48 The competition rules come into 
play when an IPR develops into a source of market power or when it 
restricts competition beyond what is justified by the protection of its 
“specific subject-matter”.49 The reason for applying competition law in these 
situations results from concerns regarding the economic functions of the 
                                                
42 The Intersection of IPR and Competition Law: Studies of recent developments in 
European and U.S Law, Hans Henrik Lidgard & Jeff Atik Eds. (Gothenburg, 
Konkurrensverket, 2008) ("Lidgard & Atik"), p. 31 Available at 
http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/ovrigt/IPR_and_CompetitionLaw.pd
f. 
43 Ulf Maunsbach, “Swedish Soda Club Dispute- Competition Law and IPR Intersection” in 
National Developments in the Intersection of IPR and Competition Law: from Maglite to 
Pirate Bay, Hans Henrik Lidgard Ed. (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) (“Maunsbach”), pp. 
145-146. 
44 David T. Keeling, Intellectual Property Rights in EU Law, V. I: Free Movement and 
Competition Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) (“Keeling”), p. 66. 
45 Consten & Grundig Fn 36 supra; Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft,  v 
Metro-SB Grossmärkte GmbH, 8 June 1971 [1971] ECR 489 (“Deutsche Grammophon“.) 
46 Today Article 36 TFEU. 
47 Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v Probel, Rees, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, 
29 February 1968, [1968] ECR 55 ("Parker, Davis & Co.) 
48Id at p. 71. 
49Keeling, Fn 44 supra, p. 66. 
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protection of intellectual property on the one hand and the prohibition of 
anti-competitive conduct on the other.50 
 
Applying the principle of “specific subject-matter” can be a complex matter. 
In certain situations, a particular exercise will fall within the scope of the 
“specific subject-matter" and thus justified even if it may lead to a reduction 
of competition, while an exercise of an IPR that goes beyond the “special 
subject-matter” will almost always will be prohibited by competition law.51 
This relates to how the “specific subject-matter” is defined. The CJEU has 
held, in regard to patents, that: 
 [T]he special subject matter of the industrial property is the guarantee 
that the patentee, to reward the creative effect of the invention with a 
view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into 
circulation for the first time … as well as the right to oppose 
infringements.52 
 
To put the CJEU’s solution in perspective, we will compare it with U.S. 
antitrust law where this topic has also been discussed.  
 
3.2 The U.S. 
The foundation of U.S. antitrust law is to a great extent similar to that of the 
EU although the U.S. Sherman Act seeks to promote competition while EU 
competition law seeks to promote a competitive environment. The U.S. 
authorities early recognised the necessity and importance of regulating both 
competition law and IPR.53 As one of the only countries in the world to 
operate in such way, the patent statue and the copyright law are based on a 
section of the Constitution which empowers the U.S. Congress: 
                                                
50 Turner, Fn 15 supra, p. 3. 
51 Maunsbach, Fn 43 supra, p. 146. 
52 Case 15/74 Centrafarm BV v Sterling Drug Inc. 31 October 1974 [1974] ECR 1148, para 
9 
53 E.g. The Patent Act of 1790 (Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 [April 10, 1790]); Trade-Mark Act of 
3 March 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, “An Act to authorize the registration of trade-marks 
and protect the same.”  
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“[T]o…promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” 54  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has the competence and is the ultimate authority 
for both IP law and antitrust legislation which permits a more systematic 
approach to the interaction problem than is the case in the EU (see the 
competence division between the Member States and the EU). The Supreme 
Court seeks to achieve a balance between adequate incentives for 
innovation, and at the same time not undermine competition.55  
 
Furthermore, what distinguishes the U.S. from the EU is its underlying 
policy in the sense that the U.S. have always been far more libertarian56 and 
conflicts relating to the intersection of competition law and IPR are often 
balanced in favour of the IPR holder.57 However, a key fact relevant to the 
differences between the U.S. and EU is that when the first U.S. antitrust 
legislation, the Sherman Act, was enacted in 1890, the U.S. already 
possessed an integrated market which thus did not need such high degree of 
encouragement and protection. 58  
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission (the “Agencies”) issued their joint Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property59 with the intention of clarifying 
the relationship between competition law and IP protection. The 
Guidelines embody three general principles: (a) for the purpose of 
antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being 
essentially comparable to any other form of property; (b) the Agencies 
do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the 
antitrust context; and (c) the Agencies recognize that intellectual 
                                                
54 Article I § Section 8 Clause. 8 of the United States Constitution 
55 Käseberg, Fn 20 supra, p. 251. 
56 Valentine Korah, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules, (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2006) (“Korah”), p. 169. 
57 Global Competition Review: The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2013. p. 16, Available 
at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/46/the-antitrust-review-americas-
2013/, (Last visit, 18 March, 2013.), p 16  
58 Korah, Fn 56 supra, p. 169. 
59 U.S. Department of Justice & the Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property (6 April 1995.) (“Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property”) Available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm 
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property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of 
production and is generally pro-competitive. 60 
 
Certain practises with respect to IPR may have anti-competitive effects, 
which the antitrust law can and does review act against. IPRs are neither 
particularly free from scrutiny under antitrust law, nor particularly suspect 
under it. The same general antitrust principles apply when the conduct 
observed involves an IPR, as is applied to conduct regarding any other form 
of tangible or intangible property.61 The Guidelines emphasize, however, 
that IPRs do still have special characteristics compared to other property and 
this should be accounted for when analysing their antitrust effects.62 Failing 
to condemn an inefficient approach to IPRs could slow down innovation and 
economic growth. But not challenging illegal activities involving IPRs 
could have considerable negative consequence on both consumers and 
competition.63 
 
3.3 The Doctrine of Exhaustion: A General 
Introduction  
To maintain a dynamic market, it is imperative to limit the exclusive right 
granted to an IPR proprietor and, in order to achieve this, the doctrine of 
exhaustion was introduced. The general idea behind this doctrine is that an 
exclusive right extends only to the first sale of the protected article. After 
the first sale, the right holder can no longer control what happens with the 
article.64 There are three different classification of exhaustion namely, 
                                                
60 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Fn 59 p. 2. 
61 Id at p.3. 
62 Id at p. 3. 
63 Id at p. 2.  
64 Ivo Van Bael & Jean-Francois Bellis, Van Bael & Bellis Competition Law of The 
European Community, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2005) (“Van Bael & 
Bellis”) p. 591. 
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national, regional, and international. Depending on which of these types 
applied by a country or region will it have an effect on international trade.65  
 
In the EU, the doctrine of exhaustion was developed through the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU. The first case on the subject was Silhouette66, 
which clarified that in order for exhaustion to apply the product had to be 
placed on the market in the EEA67 (regional exhaustion) by the proprietor 
himself or by an operator with economic links to him.68 It was further 
developed in the Peak case69 where the term “placed on the market” was 
interpreted. The Court emphasised that if the product in question, was to be 
regarded as having been placed on the market, it must actually be offered for 
sale if the exhaustion principle was to apply. The mere fact that the 
proprietor had imported the goods into the EEA area, with the intention of 
selling them there was not enough for the IPR to be regarded as exhausted.70 
The owner must have the actual opportunity to realize the economic value 
connected to the IPR.71  
 
In the U.S., the exhaustion doctrine is often referred to as the “first sale 
doctrine” and has been a part of patent law since the late 1800’s. The basic 
principle follows those recited above.72 However, in the U.S., it has long 
been questioned whether the doctrine can be limited. Since the application is 
triggered by an authorized sale by the patent rights holder, the question 
                                                
65 Frederick M. Abbot, “Intellectual property rights in world trade” in Research Handbook 
in International Economic Law Andrew T. Guzman & Alan O. Sykes, Eds. (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) (“Abbott”), p. 445. 
66 Case C-355/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 16 July 1998 [1998] ECR I-4799. (“Silhouette”) 
67 The principles of Community exhaustion were extended to the EEA by Article 2(1) of 
Protocol 28 on Intellectual Property of the EEA Agreement, holding that the Contractual 
Parties shall provide for such exhaustion of intellectual property right as laid down in 
Community law and interpreted according to relevant ruling by the CJEU.  
68 Silhouette Fn 66 supra para. 31. 
69 Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB, formerly Handelskompaniet Factory 
Outlet i Löddeköpinge AB, 30 November 2004 (Grand Chamber) [2004] ECR I-11313, 
(“Peak”.) 
70 Id at para. 44. 
71 Id at  para. 40. 
72 Mineko Mohri, Maintenance, Replacement and Recycling - Patentees' Rights in the 
Aftermarkets. Germany, the U.S. and Japan (Munich, Herbert Utz Verlag, 2010.) (“Mohri, 
(1)”), p. 46. 
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revolves around whether exhaustion can be avoided when the sale of the 
patented article is subject to conditions or restrictions.  
3.4 Implied License  
In both the UK and the U.S., the courts have long recognised the possibility 
of imposing post-sales restrictions, such as tying arrangements, field of use 
restrictions, duration or numbers of uses restrictions. Through an implied 
license, the patentee will try to control the product’s future and integrity 
while limiting the application of the doctrine of exhaustion.73 The concept is 
often used as an instrument to facilitate an objective standard of 
reasonability into the contractual relationship.74 It is applicable to situations 
where the patented products were first sold in a country outside the 
jurisdiction reviewing the purported infringement as well as to situations 
where the question of repair and reconstruction is at issue.75 
 
Situations regarding implied license are similar to the one concerning the 
exhaustion doctrine. Purchasing a product with an implied license still gives 
the buyer an implied right to use and resell the product but there is an 
important difference; the doctrine of exhaustion stems from the inherent 
limits on the IP grant, while an implied license is a quasi-contract that 
depends upon the beliefs and expectations of the parties to the transaction.76  
Additionally, infringement founded under the doctrine of exhaustion is often 
totally focused on the product sold while an accusation of infringing under 
an implied license my result from the conduct of the patentee.77  
 
                                                
73 Christina M. Sperry, Note: Building A Mystery: Repair, Reconstruction, Implied Licenses, 
and Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Manufacturing Corp. 5 B. U. J. Sci. & 
Tech. L. 9. (1999) (“Sperry”), para. 3. 
74 Orit Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 275, p. 284 (2009) (“Afori”.) 
75 Mark A. Lemley & Julie E. Cohen, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 
89 Cal. L. Rev. 1, p. 33 (2001) (“Lemley”.) 
76Id at p. 31. 
77 Amber Hatfield Rovner, Practical Guide to Application of (or Defence Against) Product- 
Based Infringement Immunities the Doctrines of Patent Exhaustion and Implied License 12 
Tex. Inell. Prop. L. J. 227, (2004) (”Rovner”), p. 246 
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The concept of an implied license was exported into the field of IP law, 
especially into patent law, with the intention of introducing a degree of 
reasonableness and order into the enforcement process.78 However, 
enforcement of an implied license can sometimes be problematic. In order to 
establish the scope and extent of the license the courts need to consider 
different aspects79, such as the reasonable expectations of the parties80 and the 
relevant circumstances of each case.81 
 
In the EU, the concept of implied license has been a matter for the CJEU to 
rule on. In Davidoff82, the owner of the mark ‘Davidoff COOL WATER’ had 
sold products to a company in Singapore. Even though the mark’s owner 
instructed that the product was to be sold only in Asia it was later 
reimported into the UK.83 The defendant argued that the owner had 
consented to re-importation and by that had also exhausted its exclusive 
rights internationally.84 
 
From a continental internal European perspective, this case would be easy to 
determine, following the doctrine of exhaustion. The rights holder had 
neither by itself or through any economically linked operator placed the 
product on the EEA market. Yet from a Common Law perspective, it was 
not that simple and clear.85 The High Court of Justice of England and Wales 
decided to refer the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling asking was 
how to interpret “with [the proprietor’s] consent” in Article 7(1) of the 
                                                
78 Id at p. 276. 
79 Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Aprocyphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied 
License in Intellectual Property Law, p. 496 (1999) (“Janis”)  
80 Afori, Fn 74 supra, p. 284. 
81 Janis, Fn 79 supra, p. 497. 
82 Joined cases C-414/99 to C-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA and Others v Tesco Stores Ltd and 
Others, 20 November 2001 [2001] ECR I-8691 (“Davidoff”.) 
83 Id at, paras. 9-12. 
84 Id. 
85 Hans Henrik Lidgard, Samtyckes betydelse vid interntionell varumärkerkonsumtion – EG-
domstolens avgörande i “Davidoff-fallet”, NIR, Nordiskt Immateriellt Rättsskydd, 2002, 
Nr. 1 pp 3-15 (“Davidoff-fallet”.) p. 6. 
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Trademark Directive86.87 Was it necessary for the consent from the proprietor 
to be express or could be indirectly understood?   
 
The CJEU started off with emphasising that the termination of a proprietor’s 
exclusive rights is a serious matter with respect to which consent must be 
clear. Consequently, the consent of the proprietor to give up its exclusive 
right must be unequivocally demonstrated. It can be express but it is also 
possible to derive the existence of implied consent from facts and 
circumstances prior to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to, the placing of 
the goods on the market outside the EEA, clearly demonstrating that the 
proprietor has indeed renounced his or her rights.88 Significantly, there must 
be no doubt as to what the proprietor meant. 89   
 
This case concerned a trademark right; however, applying the same 
principles to an implied license on a patented product seems reasonable. A 
patentee can restrict the product’s use through the instrumentality of an 
implied license so long as the lack of consent to exhaustion is unequivocally 
demonstrated. This may, however, affect other areas of law, as we will see 
in chapter four.  
                                                
86 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the 
Member States relating to trade marks OJ 1989 L 40/1.  
87 Davidoff Fn 82, para. 16. 
88 Id at paras. 45-46. 
89 Id at paras. 45-46. 
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4 Repair and Reconstruction  
The scope of a patent’s protection determines the extent of what the 
proprietor can claim as his or her exclusive right. If one without any right to 
a patent puts the technology to commercial use that falls within a patent’s 
claims, they will infringe the patent. 90  
  
This chapter aims to define what practices are allowed, after the purchase of 
a patented product, in order to maintain it in a functional condition without 
committing an infringement. The distinction between repair and 
reconstruction will be examined from EU and U.S. perspectives. It will also 
investigate how the definition of thus terms (repair and reconstruction) can 
affect competition law.  
 
A patentee’s exclusive right is exhausted by the first sale, notwithstanding 
specific maintenance actions taken by the purchaser may trigger the 
exclusive right a second time Knowing which actions of refurbishment that 
are permitted and which not is not always well-defined. The distinction 
often depends upon the facts of the specific case.91 But, a rule of thumb may 
be derived from the case law; repair does not include a complete 
reconstruction of a worn-out product.92  
 
                                                
90 Vladimir Bastidas Venegas, Promoting Innovation?: A Legal and Economic Analysis of 
the Application of Article 101 TFEU to Patent Technology Transfer Agreements, Doctoral 
Thesis (Stockholm, Department of Law, Stockholm University 2011) pp 104-105. 
Available at http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:447368 (Last visit 11 
May 2013.) 
91 Mineko Mohri, "Repair and Recycle as Direct Patent Infringement?" in Spares, Repairs 
and Intellectual Property Rights, Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders Eds 
(Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2009) (“Mohri, Repair and Recycle”) pp. 
59-60. 
92 Id at, pp 59-60. 
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4.1 The Approach and Method Developed 
in the EU 
As mentioned above, patent law remains an unharmonised area in the EU.93 
Although, of interest is that IP law issues concerning unpermitted uses, 
violations of proprietors’ rights and control of secondary markets have been 
addressed in a Union trademark case.94  
 
The Viking Gas case was referred to the CJEU by the Supreme Court of 
Denmark, which sought an answer to the question: 
[W]hether and, if so, in which circumstances, the holder of an exclusive 
licence for the use of composite gas bottles intended for re-use, the 
shape of which is protected as a three-dimensional mark and to which 
the holder has affixed its own name and logo that are registered as word 
and figurative marks, may prevent, pursuant to Articles 5 and 7 of 
Directive 89/104, those bottles, after consumers have purchased them 
and consumed the gas initially contained in them, from being exchanged 
by a third party, on payment, for composite bottles filled with gas which 
does not come from the holder of that licence.95 
  
Plaintiff, Kosan Gas A/S ("Kosan Gas"), the holder of an exclusive licence 
holder, sold and produced so-called composite bottles which held carbon 
dioxide gas (lightweight bottles).96 The shape of those gas bottles was 
registered as a three-dimensional Community trademark and as a Danish 
three-dimensional trademark in connection with gaseous fuels and 
containers used for liquid fuels.97  
 
When a consumer first purchases a composite bottle from Kosan Gas, the 
consumer pays for the gas as well as for the bottle, which then becomes the 
consumer's property. A consumer may therefore, when exchange the 
                                                
93 See Chapter 2.2.1 EU legislation 
94 Case C-46/10 Viking Gas A/S v. Kosan Gas A/S, formerly BP Gas A/S 14 July 2011 
[2011] ECR n.y.r. (“Viking Gas”.) 
95 Id  para 15. (Directive 89/104 is now Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating 
to trade marks OJ 2008 L 299/25.) 
96 Id at, paras. 8-9. 
97 Id. 
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composite bottle for a new filled by Kosan Gas, at one of the Kosan Gas’s 
dealers, only pay the price of the gas.98  
 
Viking Gas entered the market, providing a service where consumers could 
exchange their existing empty composite bottle in return for a full one.99 
Those bottles, handed out by Viking Gas, had Viking Gas labels attached 
along with information regarding the gas filling station and a further label 
providing, inter alia, information requested by law. However, the name and 
the figurative mark of Kosan Gas were still visible on the bottle, though it  
were neither removed nor covered.100 Upon learning of Viking Gas’ actions, 
Kosan Gas sued Viking for trademark infringement.  
 
Kosan Gas submitted that the doctrine of exhaustion did not extend as far as 
to authorize Viking Gas to refill and sale Kosan Gas trademarked bottles 
with gas that it supplied. The doctrine only prevents a trademark owner 
from prohibiting resale of such composite bottles when it contained the 
original gas and could not be interpreted so that it related to reuse of their 
packaging, since the packaging is not a product. Even if allowing the 
broader definition of the doctrine of exhaustion would mean that a 
competitor was only permitted to reuse the packaging but not substitution 
the product (the gas), for refilling with Viking Gas’ own product.101  
 
Viking Gas took a contrary view, holding that exhaustion of the trademark 
occurred when the consumer first bought the product, in this case the 
composite bottle, from Kosan Gas. The right conferred on the proprietor of 
a trademark cannot be extended to the point where the purchaser of that 
product is prevented from using it for the purpose for which it was 
originally placed on the market.102 In addition, Kosan Gas had previously 
sold gas in other bottles for years. Those bottles had not been registered as 
shape trademarks, but like the composite bottles, they bore the word and 
                                                
98 Id at para 10. 
99 Id. at para 11. 
100 Id. 
101 Id at para 20. 
102 Id at para 17 
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figurative marks of Kosan Gas. Viking Gas submitted that Kosan Gas had 
accepted that other firms refilled those types of bottles although they bore 
Kosan Gas’ name and logo.103 
 
First, the CJEU pointed out that the composite bottles, which had the 
intention for being re-use, could not be regarded as packages of the original 
product. The price paid by the consumers when they first purchased this 
special type of bottle was not only for the gas but also included the bottle 
itself (whose price was higher than that of other kinds of gas bottles). This 
indicated that the composite bottle itself had an economic value, which 
permitted the proprietor to realise the economic value of the trademark. In 
previous case law104 the Court has held that a sale which allows the 
realisation of the economic value of a trademark is a factor that should be 
calculated for when deciding if the exclusive right have been exhausts. 
Moreover, consumers have a legitimate interest in refilling and reusing the 
composite bottle a number of times in order to recoup the value of their 
initial investments.105  
 
The CJEU concludes by underlining the importance of striking a balance 
between the legitimate interests of the parties involved. On the one hand, the 
interests of the proprietor of the trademark; on the other, the interests of 
purchasers including their interest in fully enjoying their property right, and 
the general interest in maintaining undistorted competition.106 Lastly, the 
Court held that: 
 [T]o allow the licensee of the trademark right constituted by the 
shape of the composite bottle and proprietor of the marks 
affixed to the bottle to prevent, on the basis of the rights 
related to those marks, the bottles form being refilled would 
unduly reduce competition on the downstream market for the 
refilling of gas bottles, and would even create the risk of that 
market’s being closed off if the licensee and proprietor were to 
succeed in imposing its bottle because of its specific technical 
                                                
103 Id at para 12. 
104 Peak Fn 69 supra 
105 Id at paras. 30-32. 
106 Id at para 31. 
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characteristics, the protection of which is not the purpose of 
trademark law.107  
 
4.2 The Approach and Method Developed 
in the National Courts  
4.2.1 Sweden 
As mentioned above, the distinction made between repair and reconstruction 
is generally a matter of national IP law, rather than EU competition law. 
That said, the Swedish Patent Act108 does not contain any provision explicitly 
detailing what constitutes permitted uses of patented products. Rather, 
principles and case law provide the answer.109  
 
The opportunity to clarify the fundamental problems concerning the 
intersection between competition law and IP law was recently given to the 
Stockholm District Court in the Soda-Club case110. The facts of the case are 
very similar to the once in Viking Gas although here, the proceedings were 
launched by the Competition Authority, which had initiated its own 
investigation.111  
 
The plaintiff, Soda-Club, is one of the world’s largest manufacturers, 
distributors and marketers of home carbonation systems and owns several 
Union registered trademarks.112  When a consumer first purchases a home 
carbonation system from a Soda-Clubs dealer, they receive a starter package 
containing a full CO2 gas cylinder with the trademark ‘SODA-CLUB’ 
engraved upon it.113 
 
                                                
107 Id at par. 34. 
108 Patentlagen (1967:837) ("Swedish Patent Act") 
109 Levin Fn 19 supra p. 65. 
110 Injunction decision Fn 2 supra. 
111 Konkurrensverket dnr 632/2009 Fn 3 supra. 
112 Injunction decision Fn 2 supra p. 2. 
113 Injunction decision Fn 2 supra p. 3. 
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The defendant, Vikingsoda, is a company that sought to become established 
on the Sweden gas refill market.114 In order to achieve this, it initiated 
collaboration with a market leading German company, from which it 
purchased used gas cylinders. The majority of those cylinders were labelled 
with the trademark ‘SODA-CLUB’.115 Vikingsoda contracted the German 
company to refill the cylinders and re-mark them with the Vikingsoda logo, 
an operation that required the removal of the original ‘SODA-CLUB’ 
mark.116   
 
When Soda-Club became aware of Vikingsoda’s conduct, they commenced 
proceedings before Stockholm District Court, seeking to thereby establish 
Vikingsoda’s infringement of their Union trademarks.117  
 
Vikingsoda objected and stressed that Soda-Club had, by placing the bottles 
on the market, exhausted their trademark rights as a result of which, there 
was no infringement. The re-labelling and co-branding of the cylinders was 
thus equally not an act of infringement and, incidentally, did not give an 
impression of a commercial connection between the two companies.118 
 
In response, Soda-Club produced a license agreement. The license 
agreement, which where to be found in the box of the home carbonation 
system, demonstrating that the ownership of the cylinders had never been 
transferred to the consumers. Accordingly, the cylinders had never been 
placed on the market and Soda-Club was the remaining owner of the 
cylinder. As a result their trademark right had never been exhausted.119  
 
The District Court issued an injunction and imposed a fine directed against 
both the use of Soda-Club’s trademark and the removal of its label on the 
                                                
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id at pp 3-4. 
118 Id at p. 4. 
119 Id at p. 3. 
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gas cylinders.120 While proceedings were pending before the court, 
Vikingsoda complained to the Swedish Competition Authority alleging 
Soda-Club's abused its dominant position.121 The Competition Authority 
issued an investigation which lead to the decision of court to halt the 
proceedings pending the conclusion of the investigation.  
 
Vikingsoda requested that the Competition Authority deliver a decision 
which would have the effect of terminating Soda-Club’s abuse of its 
dominant position, primarily on the refilling market. According to 
Vikingsoda, the claimed abuse consisted of:   -­‐ Imposing unfair and anticompetitive contract terms on retailers, -­‐ Restricting consumers’ use through the license agreement  -­‐ Threatening to take legal action against independent refilling 
companies.122  
By imposing these courses of conduct, Soda-Club made it almost impossible 
for an independent refilling company to establish itself on the market.123  
 
The Competition Authority’s began its investigation by clarifying that Soda-
Club could be presumed to hold a dominant market position by virtue of its 
80% market share of the distribution market in home carbonation systems 
and its 60-70% share of the gas refilling market.124 Moreover, through the 
license agreement, Soda-Club reserved title to its cylinders in order to 
ensure that no one, except Soda-Club, was permitted to refill them. Soda-
Club agreed that the license limited competition, in regard to their own 
cylinders, but that this in no way amounted to abuse of dominance. 
Resellers are in no way hindered from introducing a competing product and 
consumers are not hindered from using competing cylinders.125 It argued that 
even if there had been an actual effect on competition, the behaviour was 
justified for objectively necessary reasons based on regulatory requirements 
                                                
120 Id at p. 8. 
121 Konkurrensverket dnr 632/2009 Fn 3 supra.  
122 Injunction decision Fn 2 supra p. 2. 
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and consumer safety. The Competition Authority did, however, not accept 
Soda-Club’s argument, and emphasised that it was not for Soda-Club to 
assess the regulatory requirements since that is the responsibility of the 
competent authority.126  
 
The Competition Authority went on to determine whether Soda-Club’s 
behaviour could amount to “tying”127 behaviour. Soda-Club sold their 
cylinders along with a requirement that they were the only company 
permitted to refill them. This behaviour had the effect that independent 
companies were not able to penetrate the market. This in turn led to 
depriving consumers of the advantage of increased competition. If 
distributors entering the market were required to sell competing products, 
they would be forced to introduce parallel systems to ensure that the correct 
cylinders were returned to the proper manufacturers. This would result in 
increased overall costs for both distributors and the customers. Enforcing a 
system such as this would constitute an abuse of a dominant position.128  
 
Considering all the above stated facts, the Competition Authority’s 
preliminary investigation indicated that Soda-Club’s actions on the market 
might be contrary to Chapter 2 § 7 of the Swedish Competition law129 in 
combination with Article 102 TFEU. The Authority determined that if Soda-
Club’s behaviour was regarded as in accordance with trademark law, this 
would rule out any competitor’s ability to challenge Soda-Club’s market 
position. Soda-Club had, through its license and distribution agreements, 
acted in a way clearly appeared to be contrary to the competition rules. The 
fact that consumers and the distributors were not de facto prohibited from 
setting up parallel system does not change that conclusion.130 Soda-Club’s 
conduct could therefore have the effect of closing the refilling market since 
                                                
126 Id at p.4. 
127 ”Tying” is the practice of selling one product and at the same time requiring the 
purchaser to take another product as well. ”Tying” may result in vertical foreclosure of 
competition in the market.  
128 Id at p. 8. 
129  Konkurrenslagen (2008:576), Chapter 2 § 7 stating Companies abuse of a dominant 
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the opportunity to refill was no longer available to other firms. The 
Competition Authority emphasised to the District Court that when the court 
were to rules on the question of trademark infringement, it must, take into 
account that Soda-Club may have violated the provisions of the competition 
rules. The Competition Authority was not convinced that the District Court 
had taken sufficient account of this relationship in its initial decision.131 
 
In June 2012 the District Court delivered its judgment, still holding that 
Vikingsoda’s business activities were not to be permitted. The District Court 
held, in regard to the competition law aspect, that this could not affect its 
assessment under trademark law. 132 
4.2.2 The UK 
Section 60 of the UK Patent Act 1977133 sets out the framework for what 
may constitute a direct patent infringement. Under Section 60(1) (a) of the 
Act, patent infringement occurs when a person, without the consent of the 
proprietor, “[M]akes, disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or imports the 
product or keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise.” The Act is in 
conformity with the provisions in the EPC, which must be to applied 
consistently across all signatory states.  
 
The meaning of the word “makes” has been interpreted in several cases, 
which confirmed that the term is to be treated as quite distinct from “repair”. 
Under UK law, repairing a patented product is not an infringement in the 
sense of “making” a new product; however it is not an independent right 
enforceable by expressed or implied license.134  
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Under an early UK case, Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Barton135, 
the right to repair was held to be found on an implied license. The Court 
explained that the implied license included a right to repair, but did not 
extend to a right to make a new product.136 The case also confirmed that if a 
purchaser of a patented article was permitted to repair it, he or she must be 
allowed to repair parts crucial to the functioning of the patented article.137 
However, the UK Patent Act of 1949 where replaced whit the Patent Act 
1977, which aimed to make UK law more in line with the EPC. With this 
change, the reasoning in the case law also altered as was reflected in United 
Wire case.138 Here, United Wire Ltd. owned patents for heavy-duty screen 
used to recycling drilled mud. The screen consisted of two main parts: a 
frame, supporting the filter, and a filter mesh. The defendant in this case 
was in the business of reconditioning worn out frames and fitting them with 
brand new meshes.139 These activities were alleged to infringe United Wire’s 
patents.140  
 
The defendant claimed that even if the product they sold was a screen in line 
with the plaintiff’s invention, this was not an infringement. The activity they 
performed was no more than a repair of the screen that had been marketed 
with the consent of United Wire. Therefore, through the marketing of the 
screen United Wire’s exclusive right was exhausted. Anyone who purchases 
a screen could prolong its life by repair regardless of whatever the plaintiff’s 
implied license contained.141  
 
Lord Hoffman, who gave the leading speech of the House of Lords, agreed 
with the Court of Appeal, which in their turn had found that the concept of 
                                                
135 Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd. and Another v Barton [1977] R.P.C. 537(CA (Civ 
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138 United Wire Ltd v. Screen Repair Services (Scotland) Ltd. [2001] F.S.R. 24 (CA Civ Div 
July 20 2000) (“United Wire”.) 
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an implied licence was not useful.142 The Court of Appeal held that the focus 
should rather be on whether the defendant had “made” the product within 
the meaning of section 60(1) (a) of the UK Patent Act.143 Lord Hoffman 
continued by stating: 
It is quite true that the defendants prolonged the useful life of the 
frame. It would otherwise presumably have been scrapped. But the 
screen was the combination of frame and meshes pre-tensioned by 
attachment with adhesive according to the invention. That product 
ceased to exist when the meshes were removed and the frame 
stripped down to the bare metal. What remained at that stage was 
merely an important component, a skeleton or chassis, from which a 
new screen could be made.144 
 
The defendant had, therefore, infringed the patent.  
 
In March of this year the UK Supreme Court145 delivered its judgment in 
Schütz146, which it distinguished from United Wire case.147 Here the appellant, 
Werit, sold bottles for intermediate bulk containers (“IBC”) used to 
transport liquids, to a reconditioner Delta Containers Limited (“Delta”).148 
Delta acquired IBCs originally sold by plaintiff Schütz, and replaced the 
Schütz bottles with Werit bottles, which it fitted into the IBC’s.149 Schütz 
alleged that the re-bottling by Delta constituted patent infringement by way 
of “mak[ing]” under Section 60(1) (a) of the UK Patent Act 1977. 150 Schütz 
filed a proceeding against Werit seeking relief on the ground that Werit had 
infringed its patent. It was held to be common ground that if Delta infringed 
the patent, so did Werit. These allegations were met by Werit’s denial of 
any infringement.151 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the only 
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relevant question was whether Delta had infringed the patent by “making” 
as defined by under Section 60(1) (a).152 
 
The Court commenced by making it clear that the interpretation of Section 
60(1) (a) and the word “makes” must be a matter of the facts of the case at 
hand.153 Moreover, as the Patent Act 1977 was intended to conform with the 
provisions in the EPC, it was important that the Court followed the approach 
established by courts in other signatory states, such as Germany. The Court 
decided to review four decisions of the German Supreme Court154, one of 
them reviewing the same claim in the German equivalent of the Schütz 
patent.155  In addition, the Court compared them with the facts of the United 
Wire case.156  
 
As mentioned above, the Court stressed that it would be a matter of fact and 
degree, to be assessed in each case as to whether replacing a worn or 
damaged part of a patented article amounted to “making”.157 In order to 
determine whether Delta “made” a new article, the Court preformed a 
multifactor analysis. It included factors such as the lifetime of the IBC 
compared to that of the bottle, the expectation whether it would be replaced 
and the inventive step involved.158 Weighing the various factors, the Court 
reached the conclusion that by replacing the bottle in the IBC, Delta did not 
“make” an article identical to the one claimed in the patent. Accordantly, 
Werit was held not to have committed patent infringement.159  
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The important difference between the two cases, United Wire and Schütz, is 
the relationship between the replaced part and the inventive step.160 In United 
Wire, the Court held that the original product ceased to exist when the wire 
meshes were removed since the inventive concept largely resided in, or was 
closely connected to, the replaced part. In Schütz, in contrast, there were two 
products which were distinguishable from each other. The bottle that was 
replaced could not be said to be included in any aspect of the inventive step. 
The Court therefore concluded that if the part replaced during the repair 
represented the inventive step of the patented product, or was closely 
connected to it, these actions would most likely constitute “making” of the 
product. 
4.2.3 Germany 
The German Patent Act, Patentgesetz, § 9 (1)161 corresponds in large part to 
the UK Patent Act 1977 Section 60(1) (a), which is explanted by Germany 
also being a signatory of the EPC. Under Section 9, the right to repair a 
patented product is included in the right to use and it has therefore, often 
been addressed under the general principal of exhaustion which has been 
considered in several cases.162  
  
In Flügelradzähler163 the German Supreme Court, Bundesgerichtshof 
(“BGH”) distinguished an admissible repair from a prohibited 
reconstruction, holding that the differences could only be determined in the 
light of the particular nature of the subject matter of the invention 
involved.164 The Court held that disputes of this kind required a careful 
                                                
160 UK Patent Act Article 1 (1) “A patent may be granted only for an invention in respect of 
which the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say- … (b) it involves an inventive 
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162 Mohri (1) Fn 72 supra p. 78. 
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balancing between the patentee’s interest in exploiting its invention and the 
purchaser’s right to use.165  
 
Like the U.K court, in Schütz, the BGH stated that the important question is 
whether the identity of the reconstructed article is maintained despite the 
replacement of parts or whether the measures constitutes the "making" of a 
new product. The more the technical and/or economic advantages of the 
invention that is realized in the replacement, the more likely such 
replacement represents an inadmissible reproduction that is not covered by 
the right to use. However, the owner of a patented product needs to be 
permitted to replace parts if the parts exchanged are commonly expected to 
be replaced during the product’s lifetime166 although such an act will still not 
be permitted if the technical effect of the invention is precisely reflected in 
the replaced part.167.  
 
The BGH developed this reasoning in its Pipettensystem case.168 The plaintiff 
in this case manufactured and sold a patent covered pipette system 
containing a recyclable hand pipette and a syringe. The invention allowed 
easy coupling and separation of the syringe from the pipette, without the 
need to touch it (thus avoiding bacterial continuation). The defendant sold 
syringes that could be used along with the plaintiff's patented hand pipette.169 
The Court found that the replacement component, the syringe, constituted a 
“means” under §10 of the Patent Act170 because it operated in conjunction 
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with the plaintiff’s invention. However, the sale of such “means” was 
permitted due to application of the doctrine of exhaustion. Replacing such 
parts, which a purchaser could expect to exchange numerous times during 
its lifespan was therefore not a "making" or construction of a new product.171 
It is clear that a patentee has a commercial interest in extending its patent 
right to also cover the replacement market but this interest is not a 
protectable. If a patentee could have the possibility of extending its right to 
a secondary market it would grant it an impermissible commercial 
advantage since it would be able to control the total output.172 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the equivalent of the Schütz patent 
was considered by the BGH in Palettenbehälter II.173.. The plaintiff in this 
case held an exclusive license to sell and manufacture a patent protected 
pallet container. The container consisted of an inner container, flat pallet 
and bars of metal in the shape of a basket. The defendant sold and 
exchanged the inner container in containers originally sold by the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff sued the defendant for patent infringement.174 The BGH began 
its reasoning by pointing out that, by the doctrine of exhaustion, the 
exclusive right belonging with the patented product is exhausted when the 
product is put on the market by the proprietor itself or with the consent of 
the patentee. The BHG continued by referring to precedents which held that 
the answer to the question of whether the identity of the container was 
maintained had to be founded by balancing the different interests involved. 
Moreover, it was also important to consider whether the technical effect of 
the patented invention resided in the part exchanged. This criterion is, 
however, only crucial if the exchange of the parts is regarded as a normal 
repair according to the prevailing market opinion.175 If the consumers and 
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trade circles believe that a replacement constitutes a remanufacture of the 
patented product, the action will constitute a patent infringement, 
notwithstanding any argument that the replacement does not reflect the 
technical aspects of the innovation.176 Furthermore, it is of importance to 
consider whether the used product is commercially worthless to the end 
consumer at the point when the inner container become worn out. If the 
used product still has commercial value, it is more likely that the end 
customer will perceive an exchange as being a mere repair.177 The BGH 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to ascertain consumers’ and trade 
circles’ understandings and expectations.178  
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
When a patented product is sold, the exclusive rights are normally 
exhausted. The then purchaser acquires the ownership and the full benefits 
of the product, which includes the right to repair it when it. But as seen in 
the chapter above, some repair activities fall outside of permitted use. 
Knowing what is included in the permitted use is essential to avoiding an 
infringement of an IPR. The problem is, however, that the distinction 
between a permitted repair and an unpermitted reconstruction is usually a 
matter depending upon the facts and degree in the specific case179, which 
makes it hard to give a clear definition of the terms. Further, the manner in 
which the doctrine of repair and reconstruction is defined not only has an 
impact on determining infringements it will also have a correlative effect on 
competition. Rights holders may try to use their exclusive rights to rule out 
competitors’ ability to challenge them on the market.   
 
The CJEU has attempted to better define the relationship between IP law 
and competition law by introducing the doctrine of exhaustion and the 
principles of existence and exercise. It has integrated various EU policies 
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and tried to ensure that the achievement of the Union’s objectives would not 
be opposed. From the case law, it may be seen that the CJEU favours a 
narrow interpretation of the doctrine of exhaustion, which leads to more 
dynamic competition. Even though one of the main purposes of IP 
protection is to ensure recoupment of investments made in research and 
development, this is not to be achieved by blocking competition. Applying a 
more restrictive interpretation of the exhaustion rule, in line with Kosan 
Gas’ approach, would lead to greater limitations on consumers’ right to 
enjoy their property and would tie them to a single suppliers. Competition 
on the market would be restricted and consequently the secondary market 
would vanish. The Swedish Competition Authority follows the same 
approach and indicates an unwillingness to accept any attempt by a 
proprietor to extend its exclusive right so as to manipulate the doctrine of 
exhaustion in its favour. According to the Swedish Competition Authority, 
this kind of behaviour is something that should be considered in an IP 
infringement procedure.  
 
Nevertheless, U.K and German law converged closer in both of the Schütz 
cases. Both the U.K and the German courts emphasised that the question 
that should be examined first is whether a defendant’s act amounted to a 
“making” of a new article. However, a clear-cut answer is not easy to find. 
Whether or not a conduct will be regarded as a repair or amount to  
“making” a new product will often depend on the context of each case. 
Applying the “making” test can give rise to strange and sometimes 
questionable results e.g. a tennis racquet manufacturer being able to 
monopolize the repair of its products, or a photocopier manufacturer being 
able to control the supply of paper used in it.180 It is therefore important to 
add some additional steps in determining what maintenance a third party 
may perform.  
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The intention of patent law is to grant the creator an exclusive right to allow 
him to recover his investment. Like competition law, patent law is important 
for creating a dynamic market and it is important that it offers good and 
sufficient protection. Nevertheless, it is clear from the case law that is not in 
the interest of patent law to extend its exclusions to the replacement market.   
 
Both the UK Supreme Court and the German BGH have adopted the general 
rule that an act is considered to constitute an infringement if, according to 
the prevailing market opinion, the replacement of a part constitutes a 
remanufacture of the patented product. However, if the purchaser can expect 
a component of the product to be exchanged several times during its useful 
life, this will most likely not be regarded as “making” or constructing a new 
article. Compared to the “making” test, there is a risk in referring to the 
“prevailing market opinion”. It might have the result that patentees will try 
to claim that any renewal of his or her product is an infringement, even if 
the part exchanged is not an essential part of the invention. From a 
competition law perspective there is a risk is that a patentee may try to 
control a broad downstream market. A focus on customers’ expectations and 
understanding will mean not only that these cases will become a battle of 
witnesses and market reviews but also that their outcome will be hard to 
predict.  
 
Adding a few additional points appears to be necessary. Even if the 
patentee’s right is exhausted by the first sale, he or she still owns the rights 
to his or her invention. Courts tend to locate protectable interest of a 
patentee if they are focussed on finding the key inventive step when 
scrutinising the patent claim. Actions falling outside of the exclusive 
protection will be regarded as a permitted repair. Accordingly, it seems as if 
the EU and the Member States all lean towards a common approach. When 
courts must choose between extensive property protection and dynamic 
competition, they will usually take the opportunity to protect competition.  
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5 The U.S. Perspective 
5.1 The Approach and Method Developed 
by the U.S. Courts 
The history of patent law cases concerning repair and reconstruction is, if 
not exactly rich, at least varied and the courts have often chosen to use 
vague language.181 The Supreme Court first described the U.S. doctrine of 
repair and reconstruction in Wilson v. Simpson182. The Court was faced with 
the question of whether the purchaser of a patented wood-planning machine 
might replace its cutting-knives when they became dull or broken. When 
examined the fact at hand, the Court noted that the knives expected lifetime 
was between sixty to ninety days, while the machine’s frame had a lifespan 
of many more years.183 As the knives were of a temporary nature and had to 
be replaced while the identity of the machine was preserved, even after the 
replacement, the Court considered the replacement of the knives as an 
permitted repair.184 
 
The first case where the Supreme Court held illegal reconstruction was the 
Cotton-Tie185. The plaintiff owned a patent for producing cotton-bale ties,186 
consisted of a metal buckle and a band. Each of the buckles was engraved 
with the words “Licensed to use once only”.187 When the cotton-bale arrived 
to the cotton mill, the ties were cut and consumed, and became scrap-iron 
and sold as such.188 The alleged infringer bought the discarded ties, recreated 
them and made the ties ready to use again.189 The Court found that the 
conduct by the defendant, when putting together the pieces of the old band, 
was an action of unlawful repair and stated: 
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The band was voluntarily severed by the consumer at the cotton-mill 
because the tie had performed its function of confining the bale of 
cotton… Its capacity for use as a tie was voluntarily destroyed. As it left 
the bale it could not be used again as a tie. As a tie the defendant 
reconstructed it....190  
 
The significant factor for the Supreme Court leading them to find the 
defendant guilty of an impermissible reconstruction, was the engraved 
words “Licensed to use once only” which restricted the use.191  
 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court explained its view of conduct that could 
constitute permissible repair in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co (“Aro I“).192 In Aro I, the plaintiff owned a patent on a 
convertible top mechanism, which included a combination of unpatented 
parts, such as the flexible top fabric. The defendant sold and manufactured 
replacement fabric tops intended for use with Aro’s patented combination. 
In essence, what the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether replacing 
the spent top fabric constituted an infringing reconstruction of a patented 
clime covering a combination of unpatented parts. 193 It concluded, “that 
reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpatented elements, is 
limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to ‘in fact make a new 
article,…”194 Replacing individual unpatented parts, one at a time, different 
parts successively, or the same part repeatedly was, according to the Court, 
“no more than the owner’s lawful right to repair.” 195  
 
However, Justice Harlan’s dissent196 outlined a multi-factor test that should 
be used when deciding a case concerning repair and reconstruction. First, 
the dissent reemphasized the idea introduced in Wilson v. Simpson, namely 
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the need to compare the lifespan of the part replaced with the useful life of 
the product considered as a whole. Second, the dissent reflected over the 
importance of the replaced element to the inventive component of the 
patented product. The third factor to examine was how important the 
replaced part was to the patent combination. The dissent asserted that one 
also needed to consider the reason behind the replacement: was it because 
the part was worn-out or was it because of any other purposes? The last 
factor introduced in the test was a balance between the different interests at 
stake.197   
 
The majority in Supreme Court tried to set clear limits on what is 
permissible repair, by pointing at replacing unpatented parts was not more 
than the owner’s right. In many ways it seemed to deliver a straightforward 
judgment, consequently, trying to argue that a repair in line with the case 
was a reconstruction could be difficult.198 However, the Federal Circuit 
managed to identify an action of impermissible reconstruction in a case 
similar to Aro I. In Sandvik Aktiebolag199, the patent claims at issue were 
directed to a drill with a shank portion and a unique carbide tip geometry. 
The drill tip was not separately patented. After using the drill for some time, 
it would become dull and require re-sharpening, as to which Sandvik issued 
guidelines. The defendant in this case offered a drill repair service, which 
included re-sharping and re-tipping (a service elected when the drill tip 
could no longer be re-sharped) of Sandviks’s drills.200 Sandvik claimed that 
the re-tipping service was an impermissible reconstruction of the patented 
drill and the defendants action therefore constituted an infringement.201 
 
Like the dissent in Aro I, the Federal Circuit listed a number of factors 
required in order to establish whether the defendant had simply repaired the 
product or made a new article. Facts scrutinized by the court were such as 
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the design and nature of the article and whether a market had developed to 
service or manufacture the part at issue. The court also reviewed if there was 
any objective evidence indicating the intent of the patentee that this type of 
action was accepted.202 The court analysed the facts of the case and held that 
the drill tip was to be regarded as “spent” when the tip could no longer be 
reshaped unless it was re-tipped. In fact, in situation like this, when re-
tipping was the only opportunity left, the tip could rather be removed. The 
work performed by the defendant was a complex procedure, which shows 
that re-tipping is more likely to be reconstruction. Once again the Federal 
Circuit compared the action at hand with the Wilson v. Simpson203 case and 
detained that the drill tip’s was not such parts that could be expected to have 
a shorter life then the rest of the machine. The drill tip’s was not 
manufactured to be a replicable part and was not attached in a manner which 
could be easily detached.204 Nor was there any evidence of a substantial 
market for re-tipping or selling replacement drills like those manufactured 
by Sandvik. This suggested that the proprietor had not intended for its drill 
to be re-tipped. The court concluded by holding that there is not bright-line 
test for determining this kind of problem. The intention of the proprietor can 
be an indicator but cannot alone determine whether it is repair or 
reconstruction issue but based on all the facts specific to this case the 
procedure by the defendant had to be considered as a reconstruction.205 
 
Following the case-law above neither the legislation, nor the courts have 
been able to fully clarify the repair and reconstruction doctrine. As a result, 
alternative solutions are sometimes invented in order to avoid an arbitrary 
application of the law. One of these attempts was addressed in the Federal 
Circuit case Mallinckrodt.206 Mallinckrodt imprinted its devices, a 
radioactive mist used in taking diagnostic lung x-rays, which were sold to 
hospitals with the notation “single use only.”207 After the hospitals used the 
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product the one time they turned to a third party, Medipart, to clean and 
service the device so that it could be reused.208 Mallinckrodt claimed that, by 
performing this action, Medipart induced infringement by the hospital and 
infringed the patent itself.209  
 
Rather than following the rule in Cotton-Tie, the District Court did not 
consider whether or not the “single use only” notice was legally sufficient 
to constitute a valid agreement. Instead, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favour of Medipart, and held that a patent holder could not 
restrict the initial purchaser’s use of the product, as this would violate the 
exhaustion doctrine.210  
 
On appeal, the Federal Court disagreed with the District Court’s reasoning 
and reversed, holding that there was nothing supporting the view that a 
patent holder could not restrict the use of its product, whit exception of 
price-fixing and tie-in restriction.211 Such restrictions are generally seen to 
hinder competition and amount to antitrust violation. To reach this 
conclusion the court first examined whether or not the doctrine of 
exhaustion was applicable. The court found that due to the conditions on the 
sale implying “single use only,” the doctrine was inapplicable. It had, 
however, to determine the validity of the printed restriction in regard to 
patent law. The court concluded that what it should consider was whether 
the restriction was reasonably within the scope of the patent, or whether the 
patentee had ventured beyond and into behaviour with an anti-competitive 
effect. If the restriction was found to be reasonably within the patent grant, 
because, for example, it relates to subject matter within the scope of the 
patent claims, the examination ends.212 If the contrary conclusion is, 
however, reached and the effects extended beyond the legal right to exclude, 
there might be anti-competitive effects. Though, such effects do not 
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automatically prohibit the restriction. In that case, the use restriction should 
then be reviewed under antitrust law in accordance with the rule of reason.213  
 
Following the court’s reasoning it appears that a patentee can impose a use 
restriction, and through that entirely contract out of the repair and 
reconstruction doctrine. This use restriction will be viewed as a contract, or 
more specifically as a license agreement regulating the buyers’ right under 
the patent. Consequently, if the buyer violates this restriction it breaches a 
contract, which will lead to patent infringement. 214    
 
As mention earlier, the doctrine of exhaustion is a longstanding principle, 
established around the middle of the nineteenth century, which says that the 
owner of a patent protected invention is free to do anything he likes with the 
product, as long as he is the lawful owner.215 Under these circumstances the 
patent holder cannot sue for patent infringement for something that the 
rightful owner does, as long it does not amount to a reconstruction. 
Mallinckrodt thus opened up the possibility that, under the terms of a use 
restriction, the patent holder may sue for infringement through to a breach 
of contract.216 Consequently, this indicates that even if the exhaustion 
doctrine is well established there may be circumstances where it is difficult 
to determine whether it is actually triggered.   
 
The pro-freedom of contract reasoning in Mallinckrodt was not to be 
supported by the Supreme Court in the decision Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Electronics, Inc. ("Quanta")217. At issue in Quanta was a licence 
agreement between LG Electronics ("LGE") and Intel permitting Intel to 
make, manufacture and sell microprocessor or chipsets using LGE patents. 
The agreement contained limitations stipulating that no license would be 
granted to any third party for any combination of the products purchased by 
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Intel with non-Intel products. In order to give effect to this limitation, Intel 
agreed in a separate agreement to give notice to its customers about this 
term.218 The defendant, Quanta, purchased microprocessors and chipsets 
from Intel and installed them in computers. LGE brought a suit against 
Quanta claiming that the by combining the product purchased from Intel 
with other computers’ constituents infringed LGE's patent. However, LGE 
did not assert patent right in the microprocessor or chipsets themselves.219 
 
The Supreme Court was faced to decide whether patent exhaustion applies 
to the sale of components of a patented system that must be combined with 
additional components in order to practice the patent method. Several 
questions had to be answered by the Court, but the significant one for this 
thesis were whether the sale of a component that substantially embodies (but 
does not contain all elements of) a patent can exhaust the patent and whether 
the sale at issue triggered patent exhaustion despite an attempt by the patent 
holder to condition the sale by imposing contractual restriction.220  
 
Regarding the question to what extent a product must embody a patent in 
order to trigger the doctrine of exhaustion, the Court observed that the sale 
of a component that does not contain all the element of a patent could 
activate patent exhaustion. It held that exhaustion is triggered when two 
conditions are cumulatively satisfied. First, the component’s reasonable and 
intended use is to practice the patent, and second, the component embodies 
essential inventive features of the patent.221 In this case, Intel's 
microprocessor or chipsets lacked function until they were incorporated into 
a computer system. The essential inventive features, the inventive part is not 
the fact that microprocessor or chipsets are combined with other parts; 
rather, it is included in the design of the Intel Products themselves and the 
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reason why these products work together. A sale of such components could, 
therefore, trigger patent exhaustion.222  
 
The limitations directed to Intel was only specified in the agreement 
between LGE and Intel. Even if Intel had provided the consumer with the 
notice, this would have no effect on the doctrine of exhaustion. Intel's right 
to sell the microprocessor or chipsets was not conditioned on the notices or 
any decision of Quanta to ignore by LGE directions.223 The Supreme Court 
confirmed the longstanding doctrine of exhaustion but it did not consider the 
issue raised in Mallinckrodt, namely the validity of the post-sale restriction. 
But, it did make it clear that patent exhaustion applies despite explicit 
restrictions implied by the patentee, as long as there has been a lawful sale 
of the patented article.224 This however caused confusion in some business 
sectors where post-sale restrictions have become accepted.  
 
Agricultural companies have embraced the patent system for the protection 
of their advances in genetically modified seeds. Unpatented seed stock 
allows farmers to reserve a percentage of the seeds of a harvest and use this 
in planting in the following years. Although, patented crop seeds typically 
make this impossible, either through technological methods that render the 
stock incapable of reproducing or through agreements with farmers at the 
time of the purchase of the seed. A licenses agreement often forbid reuse, 
and ignoring this limitation can land the farmer in court defending a patent 
infringement. 225 In Bowman v. Monsanto Company226, had Monsanto patented 
‘Roundup Ready’ soybean seed, which makes certain crops tolerant to the 
herbicide glyphosate. Monsanto sells the seeds subject to a licensing 
agreement that allows growers to plant the seed in one growing season.227 
The agreement does not authorize the grower to save and replant the 
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soybeans. Bowman purchased ‘Roundup Ready’ soybean seed for his first 
crop of each growing season although, after harvesting the soybeans, 
Bowman saved them and replanted them next season. Subsequently, when 
Monsanto discovered this practice they sued Bowman for patent 
infringement. Bowman raised the defence of patent exhaustion, claiming 
that Monsanto could not control his use because they had been subject to a 
prior authorized sale.228  
 
The Court started to explained the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine and 
patent law and held that consistent with that rationale, the doctrine restrict a 
patentee's right only as to the “particular article” sold. The doctrine of 
exhaustion leaves the patentee's ability to prevent a buyer from “making” 
new copies of the patented article untouched. This is exactly what Bowman 
did. However, if Bowman were allowed to save the seeds each years, this 
would reduce the need for the purchase of new seeds. Monsanto, while 
retaining its patent, would obtain no benefit from farmer’s annual sale and 
production of the ‘Roundup Ready’ soybeans. Consequently, Monsanto’s 
patent would give rise to limited benefits.229 What Bowman was asking for 
was an exception from a well-establish legal concept, namely that the 
doctrine of exhaustion which does not cover the right to “make” a new 
product.230 
 
The Court stressed that the reasoning in the holding is limited to the special 
situation, rather than to every case involving self-replacement. In other 
situations, self-replacement might be a necessary step in the use of the 
product. In this case, Bowman planted the soybeans to make and sell 
reproductions of them and thus deprived Monsanto’s their right, under 
patent law, to be rewarded for the sale of each article.231 The Supreme Court 
therefore found Bowman infringed Monsanto’s patent.  
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5.2 Concluding Remarks  
The debate on how to distinguish a repair from the reconstruction of a 
patented article has been ongoing in the U.S.. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
attempted to clarify the point although it is hard to find a general 
formulation which will apply to all cases. Likewise, in the European courts, 
the specific facts of each case play a major role in arriving at solution. 
However, from Aro I it is clear that the replacement of an unpatented part 
will be viewed as a repair, rather then an illegal reconstruction. According to 
the majority was the critical factor in determining the scope of the patent. 
Thus, refurbishment falling outside the patent’s scope will be regarded as a 
permitted repair. A possible result of this reasoning is that the range of 
activities, regarded as permitted repair, could be extended and the patent 
monopoly would be restricted to the very core of the patent’s claim. It may 
then also be possible for a patentee who believes that a use to which a 
purchaser will put the invention will infringe the patentee’s right, to seek an 
additional patent covering that use.232 Companies might thus patent multiple 
variations of a single invention to create a portfolio of patents that will 
protect them against competitors’ designs.233 The potential effects of such 
patenting strategies could lead to a stagnating market.  
 
In Sandvik the Federal Circuit adopted the multi-factor test applied by the 
dissent in Aro I. The court concluded that even if the drill tip at issue was 
not separately patented, the product as whole was effectively worn out and 
therefore the defendant’s actions constituted an infringement. Reading 
between the lines, it seems as if the Federal Circuit tried to balance the 
object’s commercial value to the consumer and the economic interests of 
Sandvik. As Sandvik encouraged the user to refurbish the drill tip, it seemed 
fair to judge that when this cloud no longer be performed the drill tip was to 
be discarded.   
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However, infringement litigation is time-consuming and the outcome is 
always unpredictable. To avoid this, a patentee might seek to condition its 
sales with a view to control the market. Conflicting signals have been sent 
by the courts concerning contractual restrictions on a purchaser’s right to 
use and this possibility of limiting the application of the exhaustion 
doctrine. In Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit stressed that a contractual 
restriction on the use of a patent product were allowed. It confirmed that a 
purchaser of a patented product would infringe the patent when it used the 
product in violation of a lawful restriction or condition imposed by the seller 
or patent holder. By upholding this restriction, the court effectively, allowed 
Mallinckrodt to control the application of the doctrine of exhaustion 
However, in the Quanta case, the U.S. Supreme Court did not reach the 
same conclusion and revisited the exhaustion doctrine. The Court 
emphasized that the exclusive right contained in a patent claim is exhausted 
when an article embodying the essential features of the claim is transferred 
in an authorized sale. But the Court did not discuss Mallinckrodt and left it 
open whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion could be contracted out of. It 
may be said that it at least clarified the point that a mere unilateral notice to 
the consumer is not sufficient to prevent patent exhaustion. This issue then 
became even more confusing after Bowman case, where the Supreme Court 
permitted Monsanto’s attempt to impose a license agreement that limited the  
farmer’s use of seed.  
 
In each of the above mentioned cases, finding a balance was important.  On 
the one hand the purchasers’ right to use, which includes the right to repair, 
and on the other the patentee’s right to exclude. It is sometimes necessary to 
abandon patent law thinking and to scrutinise the contractual restrictions 
under antitrust law, even if the U.S. Agency’s often recognise license 
agreement to generate pro-competition effects. The Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit do not always seem to come to the same conclusion. The 
Federal Circuit is more inclined to be restrictive in determining what could 
be a permissible repair, thereby allows the patentee a second chance to 
impose its monopoly right. The Supreme Court decisions are more reflective 
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of the line of reasoning in the EU and its Member States. However, one 
needs to remember that the Supreme Court is, as its name suggests, the 
highest level of court and when the two courts rule on the same subject 
matter, any contrary ruling by the Federal Circuit is overruled.  
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6 Final Words 
The repair and reconstruction doctrine divides renovation activities into two 
categories. An owner of a patented product is permitted to repair but is not 
permitted to reconstruct. Underlying this principle is the doctrine of 
exhaustion, which gives the purchaser of a patented product the right to use 
the product. However, even if the doctrine of repair and reconstruction 
seems straightforward, it can in practice be problematic to determine what 
behaviour that is permitted. The different situations are often salved on a 
case-by-case basis, which does not help to ensure any kind of legal 
certainty.  
 
Reading the case-law, both the on from the CJEU, the Member Stats and 
U.S., it is clear that the courts try to balance two competing interests; on one 
hand the purchaser’s property rights and on the other the patentee’s 
economic interests. From a patent proprietor’s point of view, the risk is not 
merely that someone is taking advantage of his or her creation, but also that 
a significant economic interest is at stake. If reconstructing a patent article 
were a protected interest, a patent right would decrease in value after the 
first sale and its value as an incentive to innovation would vanish. It is, 
however, important to limit the possibility of a patentee to expanding its 
exclusive right. Typical repair activities such as maintenance, services, the 
sale of replacement parts and recycling are activities that may be offered by 
third parties, and not necessarily by the original right holder. For obvious 
reasons a patentee often tries to control this lead also. The secondary market 
often generates a chance to make financial gain one more time for the same 
product. However, if the patentee has the opportunity to control these 
markets, as well, it will directly affect the right holders or the third party 
repairer’s business strategy.234 
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It is important to acknowledge the effect of this behaviour from a 
competition law perspective. By imposing post-sale restrictions on the 
purchaser, the patentee tries to controls the article after the first sale, and 
thus the secondary market. Generally, this is behaviour not supported by the 
courts. Whether the license involved is express or implied, courts tend to 
lean more in favour of a free market and permit buyers to receive the full 
benefit of using the product. Allowing a patentee to evade the doctrine of 
exhaustion and limit the purchaser’s right to use would have consequences 
not only on consumer welfare but also on the structure of the market. The 
development of a dynamic competition will be strangulated.  
 
The stronger the monopoly power of the patent is interpreted, the greater the 
possibility is that the exercise of the patent will have anti-competitive 
effects. However, even if one of the rationales of patent law is the right to 
exclude third parties from making, using or selling a patented invention, 
they are only allowed to do so to the extent this is within the scope of the 
patent granted. Use of an IPR in such a way that it will have an anti-
competitive effect will no longer fall within the scope of the patent and is 
not a protectable interest. It is therefore important, from a competition law 
perspective, to acknowledge the limited grant and scope of its protection.  
 
Reading the U.S. case-law it seems that courts are willing to accept use 
restrictions in some circumstances. In such cases, it appears to me that the 
courts tend to reverse its examination. Instead of locating the inventive step 
and the scope of the patent, the court focuses on the patentee’s intent, the 
market the consequences and what affect it can have on the future. Both for 
the medical device industry and for agriculture we have seen the possibility 
of imposing use restrictions. Even though, the Court in Bowman v. 
Monsanto Company, leaves a loophole, holding that self-replacement could 
be allowed if necessary. Once again we fall back on a very complex 
distinction of what should be permitted. The only straightforward test which 
can be deduced is a "we know it when we see it" test.       
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The CJEU opinion and the different Member State courts reflect the U.S. 
Supreme Court position more than that of the U.S. Federal Circuit. From a 
continental European perspective, an express contract imposing post-sale 
restrictions would most certainly only be enforceable between the parties 
that entered into the contract.  
 
According to the Federal Circuit in the Mallinckrodt case, the deciding 
factor was the intention of the patentee. However, from the competition law 
perspective, it seems more reasonable to make use of the theory that the UK 
and German Court referred to, namely prevailing market opinion and the 
evaluation of the inventive concept. Allowing a broad assessment of the 
doctrine of repair will increase consumer welfare by giving consumers a 
greater variety to choose from -  whether it is the products of the patentee or 
refurbished products. Patentees will probably oppose this by arguing that in 
such a case nobody would purchase the more expensive original products. 
However, there will always be consumers who prefer new products due to 
their quality and the availability of the manufacturer’s warranty.  
 
IP law and competition law are two areas of law which are always changing, 
especially in the EU. The very object of competition law has changed over 
the years, and will continue to do so. Nonetheless, they remain two equally 
important systems for the key interests of society.  
 
Whether the EU and the Member States will follow the U.S. Federal Circuit 
in allowing use licenses is not clear. Reading the Davidoff case, one sees the 
possibility of limiting the scope of the doctrine of exhaustion, but only in 
situations where the patented product is sold outside of the EAA. 
Additionally, there is a possibility under the competition provision, Article 
101 TFEU, which allow certain anti-competitive behaviour to be justified if 
reasons can be stated. Soda-Club tried to justify its license agreement by 
citing safety and health reasons but the Competition Authority did not 
accept this. As stated above, there can be other business areas where safety 
and health reasons can be so used. However, there is always a risk inherent 
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in allowing a patentee to limit the purchaser’s right to use. It would make it 
possible for the patentee to exceed the exclusivity granted under patent law 
and consequently it would give him the power to control the secondary 
market.  
 
Finally, it would have been helpful and interesting, if the Swedish District 
Court had referred a questions to the CJEU, seeking an interpretation of 
what effect an abuse of dominance may have on an infringement 
proceedings. 	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